“There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen.” So supposedly said the Russian revolutionary leader Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. The diplomatic whirlwind that has surrounded US President Donald Trump this week suggests the old Bolshevik might have been onto something.

For the protectionist president, who promises always to put America First, has in recent days instead been busy bestriding the world stage.

He and his team have done business deals in the Gulf; lifted sanctions on Syria; negotiated the release of a US citizen held by Hamas; ended military strikes on Houthi fighters in Yemen; slashed American tariffs on China; ordered Ukraine to hold talks with Russia in Turkey; continued quiet negotiations with Iran over a nuclear deal; and even claimed responsibility for brokering a ceasefire between India and Pakistan…

The pace has been breathless, leaving allies and opponents alike struggling to catch up as the US diplomatic bandwagon hurtled from issue to issue.

“Just, wow!” remarked one London-based ambassador. “It is almost impossible to stay on top of everything that’s going on.”

So what is going on? What have we learned in this frantic week about the US president’s emerging foreign policy? Is there something approaching a Trump doctrine – or is this just a coincidental confluence of global events?

A good place to start, perhaps, is the president’s visit to the Gulf where he set out – in word and deed – his vision for a world of interstate relations based on trade, not war. In a speech in Riyadh, Trump said he wanted “commerce not chaos” in the Middle East, a region that “exports technology not terrorism”.

His was a prospect of a breezy, pragmatic mercantilism where nations did business deals to their mutual benefit, a world where profit can bring peace.

As he enjoyed the flattery of his Saudi hosts and the obeisance of visiting dignitaries, the president signed – with his fat felt tip pen – deals that the White House claimed represented $600bn of investment in the US.

This was Trump in all his pomp; applauded and rewarded with immediate wins he could sell back home as good for American jobs.

Some diplomats privately questioned the value of the various memorandums of understanding. But the show, they said, was more important than the substance.

Absent from Trump’s speech was any mention of possible collective action by the US and other countries; no talk of multilateral cooperation against the threat of climate change, no concerns about challenges to democratic or human rights in the region. This was a discourse almost entirely without reference to ideology or values except to dismiss their significance.

Rather, he used his speech to Saudi leaders to make his clearest argument yet against Western interventionism of the past, attacking what he called “the so-called nation-builders and neo-cons” for “giving you lectures on how to live or how to govern your own affairs”.

To the applause of his Arab audience, he said these “Western interventionists” had “wrecked more nations than they built”, adding: “Far too many American presidents have been afflicted with the notion that it’s our job to look into the souls of foreign leaders and use US policy to dispense justice for their sins.

“I believe it’s God’s job to sit in judgement. My job is to defend America.”

That reluctance to intervene was on show in recent days when it came to the fighting between India and Pakistan. In the past, the US has often played a key role seeking to end military confrontations in the subcontinent. But the Trump White House was initially cautious about getting involved.

Vice-President JD Vance told Fox News the fighting was “fundamentally none of our business… We can’t control these countries”.

In the end, both he and Secretary of State Marco Rubio did make calls, putting pressure on both nuclear powers to de-escalate. So too did other countries.

When the ceasefire was agreed, Trump claimed US diplomacy had brokered the deal. But that was flatly dismissed by Indian diplomats who insisted it was a bilateral truce.

The centrality of Trump to US foreign policy has also become apparent this week. This is more than just a simple truism. On show was the lack of involvement of other parts of the US government that traditionally help shape US decision-making overseas.

Take the president’s extraordinary decision to meet Syria’s new president and former jihadist, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and lift sanctions on Syria. This showed the potential advantage of having foreign policy in one man’s hands: it was a decisive and bold step. And it was clearly the president’s personal decision, after heavy lobbying by both Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

It was seen by some diplomats as the quid pro quo for the diplomatic fawning and investment deals Trump received in Riyadh. Not only did the decision surprise many in the region but it also surprised many in the American government.

Diplomats said the State Department was reluctant to lift sanctions, wanting to keep some leverage over the new Syrian government, fearful it was not doing enough to protect minorities and tackle foreign fighters.

Diplomats say this pattern of impulsive decision-making without wider internal government discussion is common in the White House. The result, they say, is not always positive.

This is due, in part, to Trump’s lack of consistency (or put simply, changing his mind).

Take the decision this week to do a deal with China to cut tariffs on trade with the US. A few weeks ago Trump imposed 145% tariffs on Beijing, with blood thirsty warnings against retaliation. The Chinese retaliated, the markets plunged, American businesses warned of dire consequences.

So in Geneva, US officials climbed down and most tariffs against China were cut to 30%, supposedly in return for some increased US access to Chinese markets. This followed a now-familiar pattern: issue maximalist demands, threaten worse, negotiate, climb down and declare victory.

The problem is that this “art of a deal” strategy might work on easily reversible decisions such as tariffs. It is harder to apply to longer term diplomatic conundrums such as war.

Take Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. On this, Trump’s policy has been fluid, to put it mildly. And this week was a case in point.

Last Saturday the leaders of the UK, France, Poland and Germany visited Kyiv to put on a show of support for Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky. And in a group call with Trump on French President Emmanuel Macron’s phone, they spelled out their strategy of demanding Russia agree an immediate 30-day ceasefire or face tougher sanctions.

This was Trump’s policy too. The day before he wrote on social media: “If the ceasefire is not respected, the US and its partners will impose further sanctions.” But then on Sunday, President Vladimir Putin suggested instead there should be direct talks between Ukraine and Russia in Turkey on Thursday. Trump immediately went along with this, backtracking on the strategy he had agreed with European leaders a day earlier.

“Ukraine should agree to (these talks) immediately,” he wrote on social media. “I am starting to doubt that Ukraine will make a deal with Putin.”

Then on Thursday, Trump changed his position again, saying a deal could be done only if he and Putin were to meet in person.

This puzzles some diplomats. “Does he genuinely not know what he wants to do about the war in Ukraine?” one remarked to me. “Or does he just grasp at what might offer the quickest resolution possible?”

Into this puzzling mix fell two other decisions this week. First, Trump agreed a ceasefire after a campaign bombing Houthi fighters in Yemen for almost two months. There have been questions about the effectiveness of the hugely expensive air strikes, and the president’s appetite for a long military operation. He repeatedly told his Arab hosts how much he disliked war.

Second, Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, held his fourth round of talks with Iran over efforts to curb their nuclear ambitions. Both sides are hinting that a deal is possible, although sceptics fear it could be quite modest. Talk of joint US-Israeli military action against Iran seems to have dissipated.

What unites both issues is that the United States was acting directly against the wishes of Israel. Benjamin Netanyahu may have been the first world leader invited to the Oval Office after Trump’s inauguration, but in recent days, he seems to have been snubbed. Trump toured the Middle East without visiting Israel; he lifted sanctions on Syria without Israel’s support. His Houthi ceasefire came only days after the group attacked Tel Aviv airport.

Diplomats fear Netanyahu’s reaction. Could the spurned prime minister respond with a more aggressive military operation in Gaza?

So after this week of diplomatic hurly burly, how much has changed? Perhaps less than might appear.

For all the glitz of Trump’s tour through the Middle East, the fighting and humanitarian crisis in Gaza continues unresolved. A fresh Israeli offensive seems imminent. One of Trump’s chief aims – the normalisation of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia – remains distant.

For all the talks about ending the war in Ukraine, there is no greater likelihood of the guns falling silent. Putin’s ambitions seem unchanged. And for all the deals to cut US tariffs, either with the UK or China, there is still huge global market instability.

We do have a clearer idea of Trump’s global ideology, one that is not isolationist but mercantilist, hoping optimistically that capitalism can overcome conflict. We also have a clearer idea of his haste, his desire to clear his diplomatic decks – in the Middle East, Ukraine and the subcontinent – so he can focus on his primary concern, namely China.

But that may prove an elusive ambition. If there are weeks when decades happen, there are also weeks when nothing happens.