The following post is part of astructured, multi-week, simultaneously published exchange between Kim Carlsonand Paul Magennis, authors of  MAiD in Canada, and Gordon Friesen, President ofthe Euthanasia Prevention Coalition. These alternating messages willexplore deeply divergent views on Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD), and nomutual endorsement is implied.

Previously publishedinstalments have been:

Gordon Friesen, Monday, January 12, 2026.
Maid in Canada (MIC)    January 19, 2026.
Gordon Friesen               January 26, 2026.
Maid in Canada (MIC)     February 2, 2026
Gordon Friesen               January 26, 2026 .

On Capacity and Its Absence:

How a Structured Exchange Became a Masterclass in Deflection

When Friesen approached us about amulti-week exchange, he was clear, “my interest is to get my point of viewpublished on your blog.” Congratulations, you achieved exactly that. Your pointof view was published, repeatedly, even when it wandered well outside theagreed-upon topics.

What was supposed to be a structured,good-faith discussion became a showcase in dehumanizing statements, diversions,and inaccurate use of references. Instead of engaging with the argumentsdirectly, Friesen took off-topic detours and then claimed there was”insufficient space” to address the actual issue.

If the objective was simply to use ourplatform as a megaphone while avoiding meaningful scrutiny, then missionaccomplished. But let’s be clear, avoiding thoughtful and respectful discussionis not a position of strength. It’s what you do when you are trying to protectyour narrative.

Back to our regularly — or perhapschaotically — scheduled program

We will complete this (un)structured“exchange” by attempting to respond to this latest post and hopefully close offthis discussion back at the agreed upon topic.

Friesen begins his final contributionby conceding that he and Kelsi Sheren “have a natural connection, because weare both eligible” for MAiD, a claim he repeats multiple times. Eligibility,however, is not self-declared. It is determined following a voluntary request,informed consent, and assessment by two independent clinicians. If neither ofthem has undergone that process, then repeatedly describing themselves as“eligible” is, at best, speculative — and at worst, misleading.

Upon learning that we redacted some ofhis post Friesen stated in an email that he and Sheren “have an earnedexperiential right to discuss suicide in ways that (we) would not becomfortable with.” Based on this post and his email, he appears to believe thatmedical conditions and lived experiences grant them both freedom to speak aboutsuicide and MAiD in whatever terms they choose. Lived experience deservesrespect. But it does not grant immunity from responsibility and accountability,nor does it place anyone beyond critique. Yet his latest contribution suggestshe views them both as members of a protected class of experience — one thatmust never be challenged, corrected, or, in his words, “censored,” regardlessof how reckless and dangerous their statements may be.

“Pet theory of Carter”

We are not entirely certain, but itappears that Friesen’s reference to “pet theory of Carter” is directed at ourstatement that “Uncertainty is not justification for categorical exclusion, andarguments of this kind have already been considered and rejected by the SupremeCourt of Canada.” In doing so, he seems to suggest that reliance on Carterv. Canada[1]is inadequate or irrelevant when assessing the constitutionality of categoricalexclusions.

The constitution and the courts would disagree. InCanada, the evolution of MAiD has and will continue to be shaped by individualswith lived experience bringing Charter challenges before the courts. As areminder to Friesen, Carter did not explicitly exclude anyparticular group. The federal government chose to restrict access onlyto those whose natural deaths were reasonably foreseeable, thereby creatingcategorical exclusion. Those exclusions were subsequently challenged in Truchonv. Quebec, leading to the passage of Bill C-7.[2]As a result, individuals whose deaths are not reasonably foreseeable are nolonger excluded from accessing MAiD.  

The evolution of MAiD follows a clearconstitutional pattern: exclusions are tested against the Charter, and wherethey cannot be justified, they fall. In addition, the courts have consistentlyrejected fear and speculative concerns as sufficient justification for acomplete prohibition. To characterize this constitutional trajectory as a “pettheory” is to dismiss not merely our position, but the jurisprudential paththat has defined the legal framework itself.

The next charter challenge

John Scully is 84 years old and haslived with PTSD for approximately 30 years.[3]He has described the persistence of his symptoms in stark terms: “Everysingle night of my life now I get nightmares, horrific nightmares. It doesn’tstop.”[4]He has spoken publicly about decades of treatment and has acknowledged twoprior suicide attempts. His condition stems from nearly 50 years as a warcorrespondent covering 36 war zones.

Scully, along with Claire ElyseBrousseau, have launched a constitutional challenge seeking to end theexclusion of individuals whose sole underlying medical condition is a mentalillness.[5]Once again, history appears to follow a familiar constitutional path driven byindividuals with lived experience.

The constitutional question is notabout whether uncertainty exists in psychiatric prognostication or capacityassessments. The question is whether uncertainty or moral opposition canwithstand constitutional scrutiny as a basis for denying Scully and an entireclass of competent adults even the opportunity to be assessed for MAiD. If fearis insufficient to justify categorical exclusion in one context, it does notbecome constitutionally sufficient simply because the suffering is psychiatricrather than physical. “We all must demand that we mentally ill will be accordedidentical human rights as the physically ill, with access to MAiD on the verysame conditions that they have.”[6]

Conclusion

We agreed to this exchange on theunderstanding that it would be thoughtful, respectful, and focused on theagreed-upon topics. Rather than continuing to talk past one another, we saw itas an opportunity to engage directly in each of our concerns and differingopinions, and give readers a genuine chance to consider both views.

However, at the announcement of thisexchange, Friesen stated, “the more public interest which is stimulated, themore, we believe, that our own positions will gain traction.”[7]By his own framing, this was never about engaging meaningfully with complexethical and clinical questions. It appears his purpose was amplification andspectacle. It was an opportunity for him to rail against MAiD before anaudience that may not ordinarily engage with his work.

He also seemed to think this wassomething to be won — a “cage fight,” even a “battle of the titans,” as he putit in one of our email exchanges. From his perspective, it was a contest, withreaders cast as spectators rather than participants in a careful and principleddialogue. What could have been a meaningful exchange between individuals withopposing views was instead turned into a battleground.

Discussions about MAiD — particularlywhere mental illness is the sole underlying medical condition — require goodfaith, intellectual humility, and genuine seriousness. Mr. Friesen’s approachto this exchange was, in our view, fundamentally unserious.

Readers deserve better.

References